In this paper we develop an evidential network model for "WebTrust Assurance," a service recently proposed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. Our model augments the AICPA/CICA approach and presents five categories of assertions related to providing WebTrust Assurance. We then derive goals, sub-goals and evidence that are related to the overall assurance to be provided. The aggregation of evidence and the resolution of uncertainties in the model follow the approach of Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. Next we consider the assurance planning problem and develop a decision theoretic model for this problem. 2 We use assertion categories in place of "criteria" as used by the AICPA/CICA document.
A Decision Theoretic Approach to WebTrust Assurance Services
As audit researchers and practitioners approach the next millennium, significant changes face them, particularly with respect to the impact of information technology on the profession. One such change relates to the provision of assurance services, and of particular interest to this paper, the provision of WebTrust assurance related to electronic commerce: "According to the AICPA special committee on assurance services, the e-commerce assurance market for CPAs could grow to between $2 billion and $11 billion annually over the next few years (www.aicpa.org/assurance/index.html) [13] .
The demands for services of this nature are not only growing, but they relate to critical market impediments. As is noted by Grant Thornton [12] "A recent study by the AICPA reveals that security fears prevent 85 percent of consumers from providing their credit card number when shopping on-line". Allaying such fears is an important contribution that the audit profession may be able to provide. This article has two main objectives. The first objective is to develop a conceptual framework for evidential reasoning for the WebTrust assurance services recently announced jointly by the AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) and CICA (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants) [2] . WebTrust assurance is one of many types of assurance proposed by the AICPA Special Committee on Assurance Services [4] and involves "assuring that Web sites which offer electronic commerce meet standards of consumer information protection, transaction integrity and sound business practice" (http://www.aicpa.org/webtrust/princrit/htm).
To achieve our first objective, an evidential reasoning model is developed. This model provides a structured approach for collecting, evaluating, and aggregating evidence appropriate to the assertions, objectives and sub-objectives relevant to the WebTrust service. The traditional SAS 47 audit risk model [1] for financial statement audits does not facilitate incorporation of either interrelated evidence or interrelationships among the variables: balance sheet or income statement accounts, assertions, and audit objectives.
The second objective is to develop a decision theoretic model for determining the optimal level of assurance on important dimensions of the WebTrust assurance service. This approach will enable the assurance provider to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to achieve an acceptable level of assurance based on a cost-benefit analysis.
One important issue to be researched is the extent that the evidential reasoning approach for assurance is similar to that of auditing [19] . Clearly, the assurance provider would have a network of variables similar to those used to model an audit. For example, we might need to specify the various assertions related to the assurance service being provided and then specify related objectives and sub-objectives. Conceptually, these variables would be connected to each other through various logical relationships. In order to provide assurance, each variable ultimately would need to be connected to one or more items of (sufficient, competent) evidence. In certain situations, one piece Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences -1999 0-7695-0001-3/99 $10.00 (c) 1999 IEEE Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences -1999 1 of evidence may support more than one variable making the evidential diagram a network.
One issue that needs to be considered is the nature of the WebTrust assurance statement. In auditing, we have many variables and types of evidence leading to an essentially binary output (i.e. an unqualified or qualified opinion). But in WebTrust, we have factors which lead to an n-nary output (an opinion concerning business policies, information security and transaction integrity). Here, the assertions are at the level of the individual assurance statements. And, as will be evident in the following models, this leads to somewhat different evidential issues than for the traditional audit.
In the present paper, we express the strength of evidence through belief functions [14] . Shafer and Srivastava [16] and Srivastava and Shafer [18] argue that belief functions provide a better framework for representing the strength of evidence than the probability framework. Moreover, Curley and Golden [6] contend: "... that belief functions offer promise as a language for representing degrees of belief, particularly for capturing degree of justification or support (p. 298)."
We use a computer program 'Auditor's Assistant' developed by Shafer, Shenoy, and Srivastava [15] to draw the evidential network and aggregate evidence. However, we make no attempt in the paper to measure the strength of evidence.
We take the basic framework developed by the AICPA/CICA and classify their principles and controls into various assertion categories, objectives and sub-objectives. Also, we suggest some audit procedures that would provide items of evidence for corresponding assertions, objectives and subobjectives. We also generate two new assertion categories or principles in AICPA/CICA terminology (Legal Environment, and WebTrust Seal Management Appropriate) that appear to be important in an international context 1 . We then provide relevant objectives and sub-objectives along with appropriate procedures for collecting evidence.
This article contributes to assurance literature in two significant ways. First, it is the first research that looks at assurance services, in general, and at WebTrust assurance, in particular, using an evidential reasoning approach. Second, it is the first study in the auditing and accounting literature that introduces the concepts and methods for making decisions using an expected 1 There may be additional assertion categories that need to be considered. utility theory approach under conditions of ambiguity and the belief-function framework. Also, this study is the first one to introduce a decision theoretic approach of combining risks concerning the various assertions of the assurance service. Since the incremental cost in providing an assurance service depends on the individual risks associated with different assertions, it makes economic sense to combine these risks using a decision theoretic approach. This approach is different from the traditional audit approach where the risks or assurances are combined without explicit consideration of the expected liability associated with each audit assertion or objective.
The remaining part of the paper is divided into three sections. The following section describes the conceptual framework for evidential reasoning for assurance services. The next main section describes a cost-benefit approach to providing WebTrust assurance based on the expected utility theory approach. The final section summarizes the conclusions and describes the limitations of the study.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVIDENTIAL REASONING
The proposed conceptual framework for evidential reasoning is primarily based on the documentation provided by the AICPA/CICA [2] for WebTrust assurance services. In addition to the three assertion categories 2 described by the AICPA/CICA, we introduce two other assertion categories that should be considered in providing the WebTrust assurance service.
The global environment for electronic commerce is the major reason for the additional assertion categories. Later in this section we discuss these additions in more detail. Table 1 describes the assertion categories along with the related objectives and sub-objectives for WebTrust assurance services. The first column lists the five assertion categories that would need to be considered when providing WebTrust assurance: 'Business Practice', 'Transaction Integrity', 'Information Protection', 'Legal Environment', and 'WebTrust Seal Management Appropriate'. According to the AICPA/CICA, the Business Practice assertion category implies that the entity will perform at some reasonable level of belief for all disclosed business practices. This includes terms and conditions of each transaction, the nature of goods and services provided, any warranty coverage, and information on customer claims. These conditions are expressed as objectives in column two of Table 1 . The assurance provider will need to collect sufficient, competent evidence in support of each of these objectives. When there is competent evidence that these objectives have been met, the assertions within the Business Practice category are judged to be met. In some cases, these objectives are further divided into sub-objectives that are listed in column three in Table 1 . The objectives and sub-objectives are related such that the main objective is met if and only if the corresponding sub-objectives are met.
Five Assertion Categories

Evidential Network
We present an evidential diagram in Figure 1 for the assertion category Business Practice along with all its objectives and sub-objectives. Such an evidential framework provides a structured approach to evaluate all the evidence the assurance provider collects in support of the assertions. The rectangular nodes with rounded corners in Figures 1-5 are known as variable nodes in an evidential diagram [19] . These variable nodes represent assertions, objectives, and subobjectives. They have values such as 'true' or 'false' that the assertion or objective has been met or has not been met. The rectangular boxes in Figures 1-5 represent evidence nodes. These evidence nodes represent the procedures preformed by the assurance provider. Nodes with '&' in a circle represent an 'and' relationship between the variables to the right of it with the variable on its left. For example, in Figure 1 , the four objectives to the right of Business Practice are related to it through an 'and' node. This relationship implies that the assertion that Business Practice standards are being met will be true if and only if the four objectives have been met.
In order to determine whether the Business Practice assertion has been met, the assurance provider would perform all the procedures described in rectangular boxes (evidence nodes) in Figure 1 . Each procedure acts as an item of evidence providing support (or possibly non-support or mixed support) to the assertion or objective to which it is connected. Based on the findings on each of the procedures, the assurance provider can estimate the level of support from each item of evidence for the corresponding objectives and sub-objectives [6] . The level of support can be expressed in terms of belief functions [16, 18] or some other calculus based on probabilities, fuzzy logic, etc. We use belief functions and a computer program "Auditor Assistant" [15] to aggregate these items of evidence. For the inputs shown in Figure 1 , the overall belief supporting the assertions related to Business Practice is 0.956.
The first number in a variable node is the level of support in favor of the node and the second number is the level of support for the negation of the node. 'Auditor Assistant' can be used to perform sensitivity analysis on the level of support desired from various items of evidence and the overall belief desired on the node or assertion of interest. Figure 2 represents an evidential diagram for the assertion category Transaction Integrity. The general assertion is that transactions have been properly processed and it is connected through an 'and' node to four objectives: 'Order accurate and complete', 'Order accepted before shipment', 'Proper shipping or delivery', and 'Proper billing'. These objectives are derived from the AICPA/CICA description of 'Transaction Integrity.' In other words, a transaction has integrity only if the order is accurate, complete, accepted, shipped properly, and billed correctly.
Figure One
A possible set of audit procedures is described in the evidence nodes shown in Figure 2 for this case. These procedures are not meant to be exhaustive; there could be several other procedures as described in AICPA/CICA document. Our purpose here is to demonstrate how a conceptual framework for evidential reasoning can be developed using assertions, objectives, sub-objectives, relationships among the variables, and items of evidence. For the assumed input values for the level of support from each item of evidence in Figure 2 , the overall belief in Transaction Integrity is 0.983. Figure 3 represents an evidential diagram for the assertion Information Protection.
Figure Two
Information is assessed to be appropriately protected if and only if the following objectives have been met: 'Protection from external access', 'Protection during transmission', Protection from internal misuse', and 'Protection from improper use of customer computers and its files'. As listed in Table 1 and also shown in Figure 3 , these objectives are further decomposed into sub-objectives. For example, the objective 'Protection during transmission' is met if and only if the sub-objectives, 'Reliable transmission', and 'No interception' are met. In other words, if the information is protected during transmission by using encryption technology or other techniques, and if the customer information is not stolen during transmission, then the objective 'Protection during transmission' is met. Again, some suggested procedures are represented through rectangular nodes in Figure 3 for this case. For the assumed level of support from various items of evidence in Figure 3 , we obtain 0.99 level of support for Information Protection. Such a high level of support may be desired by the assurance provider because of high costs of liability if this assertion is not met. Let us consider another scenario for the Information Protection assertion. Suppose the assurance provider finds that the web site does not have good control over the sub-objective 'No Unauthorized Access to Customer Data' and expresses a judgment with a level of support, say 0.9, for the negation of the subobjective. Even if the other items of evidence provide the specified levels of positive support to the respective variables as is shown in Figure 3 , the overall belief that the Information Protection assertion is true is only 0.189 with a 0.730 level of belief that it is not true. Although the other objectives and sub-objectives have been met with at least 0.98 level of support, the belief that Information Protection is true is now only 0.189. This is because of the 'and' relationship between the assertion and its four objectives. The assertion is met if and only if all its objectives are met. Strong negative evidence that leads to a 0.9 level of belief that 'No Unauthorized Access to Customer Data' is not met is the reason for the overall belief in support of the objective 'Protection from Internal Misuse' to be only 0.189.
Figure Three
The overall belief against the objective 'Protection from Internal Misuse' is 0.730. This is quite strong belief that the assertion is not met. In such a situation, the assurance provider may decide either to issue a qualified opinion or withdraw from the engagement depending on the cost and benefit analysis of the engagement as presented in the next section. Figures 4 and 5 represent the evidential diagrams for the assertions, Legal Environment and WebTrust Seal Management Appropriate. These assertions are not discussed in any detail in the AICPA/CICA document. However, we believe that these assertions are important. First, the assertion 'Legal Environment' means that the assurance provider must assess whether the entity selling the goods or providing the services is in compliance with the legal requirements of doing business. This would mean that the assurance provider needs to evaluate compliance with the rules and regulations of the state government, federal government, and appropriate international agencies 3 . Even if the other three assertions (Business Practice, Transaction Integrity, and Information Protection) are fully met, lack of compliance with applicable legal conditions would make the WebTrust assurance certification fallacious and this may result in liability to the assurance provider. The first two objectives are further divided into subobjectives. Such an approach of dividing assertions into objectives and sub-objectives provides a structured 3 Providing assurance for legal requirements that span the global market may turn out to be a daunting task to the extent that the assurance provider only provides a low level of assurance or none at all for this aspect of electronic commerce. approach for the evidence gathering process to the assurance provider. Although it is an empirical question, a structured approach of identifying and collecting evidence relevant to various objectives and sub-objectives of an assertion could make assurance services relatively more efficient and effective.
The assertion 'Seal Management is Competent' is divided into three sub-objectives:
Training, Experience, and Certification. 'Training' implies that the seal manager has proper training in the field. 'Experience' implies that the seal manager has proper experience in the field and 'Certification' implies that the seal manager has proper schooling and certification.
The second objective, 'Seal Management is Independent' is further divided into two sub-objectives: 'No financial Interest Direct/Indirect' and 'No Administrative Interest Direct/Indirect.' These objectives are based on the concepts developed in external auditing. We associate the same meanings to 'direct interests' and 'indirect interests' as defined by AICPA Professional Standards [3] . If the assertion 'WebTrust Seal Management Appropriate' is met, then the assurance provider would be willing to take the engagement (if the cost-benefit analysis described later is positive). This assertion is important, especially, in an international setting. In a US financial statement audit, this may not be a significant issue because the regulatory agencies are viewed as being independent, having integrity, and having the power to enforce and sanction.
We need similar attributes in the international setting of the WebTrust seal manager.
We have explored the above ideas and suggested some relevant objectives and sub-objectives along with appropriate evidence collection procedures for determining the overall level of assurance obtained for the assertion, as shown in Figure 5 (see also 
DECISION THEORETIC APPROACH TO WEBTRUST SERVICES
As discussed in the previous section, in a WebTrust assurance service, the assurance provider would accumulate various items of evidence pertaining to each relevant assertion. Assume for the present discussion that the assurance provider will not provide the service if the WebTrust manager is not trustworthy. Thus only the other four assertion categories need to be considered for planning purposes: Business Practices (B), Transaction Integrity (T), Information Protection (I), and Legal Environment (L) 4 .
In order to give unqualified assurance, the assurance provider would like to obtain a target level of belief on each of the four assertions. However, that level may vary for each assertion because of a different loss function associated with each assertion if it is not met 5 . For example, the assurance provider might give unqualified assurance if he or she is confident with a degree of belief 0.95 that Business Practice is met (Bel(b) = 0.95), with 0.98 degree of belief that Transaction Integrity is met (Bel(t) = 0.98), with 0.99 degree of belief that Information Protection is met (Bel(i) = 0.99), and with 0.95 degree belief that Legal Environment is met (Bel(l) = 0.95). In the above example, we assume that a rational assurance provider would chose a lower threshold level of belief for an assertion which is assessed as having lower risk.
Strat [20, 21] has developed an approach for making decisions where ambiguity exits. Such a situation is best modeled using belief functions. Under the belieffunction framework, uncertainties associated with each state 6 of nature in a decision problem may not add to one [16] . As a result, there would exist a certain level of ignorance or ambiguity with each state of nature. Strat's approach provides a general framework for making decisions under such ambiguities. In his approach, the decision maker first resolves the ambiguities by redistributing them to various states of nature and then determines the expected value for the payoffs.
Recently, in an attempt to explain "Ellsberg paradox" [11] , Srivastava [17] has demonstrated that a conservative approach to resolving ambiguity by decision-makers models well the Einhorn and Hogarth [9, 10] empirical findings. However, in the present paper, we use Strat's general approach [20, 21] of decision making under belief functions and discuss the results under various risk scenarios. 4 We will represent assertions by upper case letters and their values by lower case letters. For example, the 'Business Policy' assertion is represented by 'B' and its values are represented by 'b' meaning that it is met and '~b' that it is not met. 5 The IFAC exposure draft Reporting on the Credibility of Information states that "The framework and general principles allow for any level of assurance to be expressed …" (International Auditing Practices Committee. 1997. Preface). 6 By definition, these states form a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set. Suppose that the assurance provider gives unqualified WebTrust assurance when beliefs on the individual assertions reach the desired threshold values, say, Bel(b) = m B , Bel(t) = m T , Bel(i) = m I , and Bel(l) = m L . For simplicity, we assume that the assurance provider has no evidence against the assertions, i.e., Bel(~b) = 0, Bel(~t) = 0, Bel(~i) = 0, and Bel(~l) = 0. Assuming any of the m values are less than 1, there is ambiguity in each assertion as to whether it is met or not. However, this assumption does not limit our approach.
Ambiguity in a state is measured by the difference between the respective plausibility and belief functions. For example, ambiguity in b or in ~b is given In order to use decision theory, one needs to resolve the ambiguity and then determine the expected value of the payoff for the decision. Strat proposes resolving ambiguity through the use of a parameter ρ ( 1≥ ρ ≥0). A value of ρ = 0 means that the decision-maker is most conservative and resolves the ambiguity in a riskadverse manner. A value of ρ = 1, on the other hand, means that the decision-maker will resolve ambiguity in a risk-seeking manner. Based on this scheme, if we resolve the ambiguity, Pl We can see that in the most conservative case (ρ = 0) all the ambiguity is assigned to the negation of b which is consistent with risk averse preferences. However, if we assume that the resolution is made in a risk-seeking manner (ρ = 1), then all the ambiguity is assigned to 'b'. We will develop the decision theoretic approach for the general case and then use various values of the parameter ρ to discuss the impact of risk attitude on various decisions.
The assurance provider faces possible liability or cost for giving unqualified WebTrust assurance when one or more assertions are not met. This cost, in general, would depend on how many assertions are not met. To make the model more general, we consider different costs or liabilities for different assertions not being met. Also, we assume that there is an additional cost if more than one assertion is not met. This assumption is made to reflect the real world. It seems 7 logical that if only one assertion is not met, then the court may decide it to be just a case of negligence. However, if two or more assertions are not met, then the court may decide that the assurance provider was grossly negligent resulting into a higher cost than the sum of the individual costs. In those cases where this is not true, one can always set the additional costs to zero. Table 2 provides definitions of various costs considered in the present discussion. We use symbols C B , C T , C I , and C L to represent the individual costs when the respective assertions, Business Practice (B), Transaction Integrity (T), Information Protection (I), and Legal Environment (L) are not met. We use C BT , C BI , C BL , C TI , C TL , C IL , C BTI , C BTL , C BIL , C TIL , and C BTIL to represent the incremental costs when the related two, three or four assertions are not met. As an illustration, a numerical example will be discussed later in this section. 
KB
Cost incurred by the assurance provider in collecting evidential matter to achieve the desired level of belief, mB, on 'Business Policy' assertion to accept that it is met.
KT
Cost incurred by the assurance provider in collecting evidential matter to achieve the desired level of belief, mT, on 'Transaction Itegrity' assertion to accept that it is met.
KI
Cost incurred by the assurance provider in collecting evidential matter to achieve the desired level of belief, mI, on 'Information Protection' assertion to accept that it is met.
KL
Cost incurred by the assurance provider in collecting evidential matter to achieve the desired level of belief, mB, on 'Legal Evaluation' assertion to accept that it is met. Table 3 lists all the states with corresponding mvalues after resolving the ambiguity in the general way and the corresponding payoffs. The expected value 8 for the decision when the assurance provider gives an unqualified assurance is given by: 8 One could easily use the utility theory approach in the present discussion. However, for simplicity of presentation, we prefer to use expected value of payoffs rather than the utility function. 
where m' = m + ρ(1-m), and m' represents the revised m-value after ambiguity is resolved. F represents the fee for the assurance service and K represents the cost of gathering evidence to obtain a level of belief equal to the desired threshold value for the assertion. The ambiguity resolution parameter ρ depends on the risk attitude of the decision-maker. Table Three   Table 3 Payoff 
3.1Discussion of Results
Equation (1) yields results that make logical sense. For example, if we assume that the assurance provider obtains 100 per cent assurance that all the assertions are met (.e.g, m B = m T = m I = m L =1.0) then the expected value of the payoffs for giving an unqualified assurance is simply (F -K B -K T -K I -K L ) which is just the difference of the fee and cost 9 of providing the service. However, if there are uncertainties (risks) whether or not the assertions are being met, then the expected value incorporates the liabilities or costs to the assurance provider associated with those risks. We discuss a few special cases below.
Case 1: No Incremental Joint Costs
Under the assumption that there are no incremental joint costs or liabilities to the assurance provider (e.g., C BT = C BI = C BL = C TI = C TL = C IL = C BTI = C BTL = C BIL = C TIL = C BTIL = 0), Eq (1) yields: 9 In general, we assume that the cost of collecting sufficient competent evidence to obtain the desired level of belief in an assertion varies with the level of belief.
In general, we use different ρ's for different assertions because the decision-maker may respond differently to different assertions. In this case, the expected value is equal to the assurance fee minus the cost of providing the assurance service less the expected cost or liability associated with the risk of each assertion not being met.
Numerical Example
Suppose that the assurance provider is a risk averse individual and has the following cost structure for providing WebTrust assurance with the respective assurances as: This expected value implies that $25,000 is the minimum fee the assurance provider could charge for the above WebTrust assurance service and expect to break even. This result makes logical sense if we assume that there are no interactions among the assertions. However, it appears likely that when more than one assertion is not met, the liability to the assurance provider will be more than the sum of the individual costs. For example, the court may decide that the assurance provider was grossly negligent when all the four assertions are not met and may hold the provider liable for more than the sum of the individual expected losses. Least Conservative Resolution of Ambiguity (ρ = 1): Under this scenario, the decision-maker takes the risk by resolving the ambiguities by assigning it to the respective affirmation of the states. This process yields an expected value of giving an unqualified report to be: E(Unqualified Assurance) = F -10,000. This result shows that $10,000 is the break-even point for the service if the service provider is a pure risk seeker. A value between $10,000 to $25,000 is appropriate as the break-even point for the audit fee if 1>ρ>0.
Case 2: Risk of One Assertion Not Being Met
Assume that the assurance provider has given unqualified WebTrust assurance with the following level of individual beliefs: Bel(b) = m B , Bel(t) = Bel(i) = Bel(l) = 1.0. The expected value in this case will be
The term C B (1-m B )(1-ρ B ) in the above equation represents the expected cost or liability to the assurance provider for not being 100 per cent sure that the 'Business Policy' assertion is met. This term is the product of the cost and the risk the assurance provider has about the assertion.
Case 3: Risk of Any Two Assertions Not Being Met
Under the assumption where only two of the assertions are not met, the expected value of payoffs can be written as:
where i and j stand for different assertions.
Case 4: Risk of Any Three Assertions Not Being Met
When three of the assertions are not met, the incremental cost could be just represented by one interaction term. For example, assume that 'Business Policy', Transaction Integrity, and Legal Environment are met with a belief of m B , m T , and m L , respectively, and Information Protection is met with 100 per cent assurance. The expected payoffs in this case becomes:
Numerical Example:
Consider the following cost structure 10 with the corresponding beliefs that the assertions are met. K B = $2,000, K T = $3,000, K I = $5,000, K L = $2,500, and C B = $100,000, C T = $150,000, C I = $200,000, C L = $100,000, and C BTL =$100,000,000, with Bel(b) = m B = 0.95, Bel(t) = m T = 0.98, Bel(i) = m I = 1.0, and Bel(l) = m L = 0.95. From Eq. (6), we obtain: E(Unqualified Assurance) = F -2,000 -3,000 -5,000 -2,500 -5,000(1-ρ B ) -3,000(1-ρ T ) -5,000(1-ρ L ) -5,000(1-ρ B )(1-ρ T )(1-ρ L ) (7) Most Conservative Scenario (ρ = 0): If the resolution of ambiguity is made in the most conservative way, the expected value of giving unqualified opinion will be (from 7): E(Unqualified Assurance) = F -30,500.
This result shows that a risk-averse assurance provider should charge a minimum $30,500 fee for the WebTrust assurance service. Even though the expected liability cost of "gross negligence" is assumed to be very high ($100 million), the joint belief of three assertions not being met is very small and thus the net change in the expected cost is small.
Least Conservative Resolution of Ambiguity (ρ = 1): This case is the extreme case where the decision maker is assumed to be a risk seeker and the breakeven fee would be just the direct cost of conducting the assurance service which is $12,500 in this case.
There are many other scenarios where the assurance provider does not obtain the desired level of belief for the assertion of interest. In such situations, depending on cost-benefit analysis, the assurance provider will either issue an appropriate qualified opinion or withdraw from the engagement.
CONCLUSION
This study has considered two theoretical aspects of assurance services. The first relates to the type of evidential networks that professional accountants require in order to plan and provide assurance. To illustrate this network, we developed an evidential model for "WebTrust Assurance", a proposed service jointly announced by the AICPA and the CICA [2] . Of course, the general research area this study relates to is much broader than WebTrust itself. For example, Debreceny and Gray [8] identify a number of Quality Assurance Services (QASs) which are similar in nature to WebTrust assurance. Our model augmented the AICPA/CICA approach to providing WebTrust Assurance and presented two additional categories of assertions ('Legal Environment' and 'WebTrust Seal Management Appropriate') related to providing this service. The resolution of uncertainties in the model follows the belief-function approach of Srivastava and Shafer [18] . Importantly, our evidential reasoning approach using networks is able to incorporate all potentially relevant relationships and interdependencies among variables and evidence.
Next, we developed a decision theoretic model for the problem of whether the auditor should take on the assurance service represented by the evidential network. Our approach was based on estimating the expected value of providing various levels of assurance and was illustrated with several different scenarios that may be faced in practice. As expected, the cost factors that were important included the estimated cost of obtaining evidential matter and the incremental cost (liability) incurred when assertions as not met for clients who have obtained a "clean" WebTrust seal.
This article contributes to the assurance literature in two significant ways. First, it the first research that provides an evidential network for assurance services and more specifically looks at WebTrust assurance using an evidential reasoning approach. Second, it the first research that introduces the concepts and methods for making decisions using an expected value approach under the belief-function framework and shows how this approach can be used to model the desired level of assurance in various assertions and the corresponding audit fee structure. Third, based on Strat [20] , our research also explicitly addresses the issue of how ambiguity (lack of evidence) can be modeled in an assurance situation. For example, for Case 4 (see pp. [18] [19] we have calculated a range of from $12,500 to $30,500 as the expected cost of providing WebTrust assurance depending on whether the auditor is risk seeking or risk averse.
Being both a modeling paper and the first to attempt to identify some of the issues related to the provision of WebTrust assurance presents both certain limitations and opportunities for future research. Although the models we present in figures 1 through 5 offer a great deal of detail, they are far from complete models for WebTrust assurance. For example, we have only sketched a few evidential nodes that may be relevant. Future research in both academia and practice need to improve the model by, for example, delineating the specific assertions within each category and the types of evidential matter that may be relevant. Debreceny and Gray [8] and Debreceny [7] offer some ideas for the latter issue.
The approach we took for the expected value model also involved a number of assumptions and simplifications that need to be the subject of future research. The empirical implications of the Strat [20] approach should also be investigated.
The cost functions we developed, although somewhat complex, are linear and assume additive costs. In practice, it has been suggested [2. http://www.aicpa.org/webtrust/princrit/htm and 8] that information technology will facilitate collection of cost and other assurance evidence. This and many other empirical questions in this arena remain to be researched.
